

OWASP Serverless Top 10

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4ppsec



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cloudessence

Co-Founder & CTO


Acquired by Contrast Security, 2020




Protego

Head of Security Research

Acquired by CheckPoint, 2019





● **Serverless computing**
Topic

● **serverless security**
Search term

+ Add comparison

Worldwide ▼

1/1/16 - 9/29/22 ▼


All categories ▼


Web Search ▼

! **Note:** This comparison contains both Search terms and Topics, which are measured differently.

[LEARN MORE](#)

Interest over time ?





CONTRAST

Applications

Servers

Libraries

Vulnerabilities

Serverless

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Provider: aws | Region: us-west-1


Functions

Scans

Vulnerabilities

Graph

Settings




@4ppsec

Serverless Architecture


Architecture




Cycles




Process




Decision




Event-driven architecture




- Triggered via events
- Container spins up when required
- Terminates when code execution




AWS Lambda - Security Aspects



- Read-only environment, except for */tmp*
- Not wired to the internet*
- Data is temporary**
- Code reside in environment
- Keys are available as environment variables




OWASP Serverless Top 10



- Current project state:
 - Interpretation of Top 10
 - Open Data Call: <https://appsec.it/serverless-call>
- Goal: Serverless-tailored Top 10

<https://owasp.org/www-project-serverless-top-10/>

Event Injection



- Multiple, uncontrolled entry points
- Traditional injections (cmdi, no/sqli, etc).
- Per-language Code Injection
- New Injections (MQTT, Email, Pub/Sub)
- Impact depends on the function permissions

Injection Entry Points



REST APIs

3rd-Party Application

Cloud Storage (S3)

Authentication Services

Logs and Events


IoT


Voice (Alexa)

Email

SNS

Code pipelines






Event Injection - Best Practices

- Never trust, pass or make any assumptions regarding input and its validity from any resource
- Use positive or “allowlist” input validation when possible
 - Api Gateway allow configuring json model for requests
- Consider all event types and entry points into the system
- Run functions with the least privileges required to perform the task to reduce attack surface

Broken Authentication




- Functions are Stateless
- Multiple entry points, services, events and triggers
- No continuous flow


Broken Authentication - Best Practices

Apply the zero-trust principle to your code

- Use authentication services whenever possible
- Access tokens (e.g., JWT) can include signed custom data
- If necessary, store a “state” OOB
- Perform input validation and run with “Least Privileges”




Sensitive Data Exposure




- Same as any other cloud-based data
- Common serverless scenarios:
 - Data under /tmp
 - Sensitive data in environment variable
 - Sensitive data in an open bucket
 - Source code is also in the environment

Sensitive Data Exposure - Best Practices

- Whenever possible, delete /tmp after use
- Use KMS to encrypt environment variable/sensitive data
- AWS Secret manager (or Parameter Store)
- Make sure your Buckets and other resources are set with secure configuration
- Use designated tools (e.g., AWS Macie) to identify sensitive data
- Run as “Least Privilege” to reduce access to sensitive data




Over-privileged Functions



- Over privileged functions
- More than 90% are misconfigured
- Impact of other vulnerabilities depends on the permission given to the function
 - In extreme cases - full cloud account takeover

Resource-Based IAM



DVSA-ORDER-NEW

```
def lambda_handler(event, context):
    orderId = str(uuid.uuid4())
    itemList = event["items"]
    status = 100

    userId = event["user"]
    address = "{}"
    ts = int(time.time())
    dynamodb = boto3.resource('dynamodb')
    table = dynamodb.Table(os.environ["ORDERS_T
    response = table.put_item(
        Item={
    )

    if response['ResponseMetadata']['HTTPStatus'] == 200:
        res = {"status": "ok", "msg": "order cr
    else:
        res = {"status": "err", "msg": "could n

    return res
```

Execution role

Role name

[serverlessrepo-DVSA-OrderNewFunctionRole-N65M2RQ1B6QS](#)

Resource summary



Amazon DynamoDB
1 action, 2 resources

To view the resources and actions that your function has permission to access, choose a service.

By action

By resource

Action


Resources

dynamodb:PutItem

Allow: arn:aws:dynamodb:us-east-1:402181209224:table/

Over-privileged Functions - Best Practices

- **Review each resource and apply least privileges**
- **Automate!**




Vulnerable Dependencies

- Using dependencies which are insecure
- Very common
- Functions may have 100 lines of code, but they bring everything with them


Vulnerable Dependencies - Best Practices

- Scan your dependencies before deploying into production
- Open-source, 3r-party
- Use secure versions, replace library or apply patch




Insufficient Logging & Monitoring

- More difficult than traditional web applications
- We don't own the infrastructure - where to deploy?
- Logs exist, but we need to know how and what to extract.
- Even if we do:
 - with 1M invocations - how can we learn anything?



Sump-up



~~Event Injection~~

~~Broken Authentication~~

~~Sensitive Data Exposure~~

~~Over-Privileged Functions~~

~~Vulnerable Dependencies~~

~~Insufficient Logging & Monitoring~~



Open Resources

DoW / DoS

Insecure Shared Space

Insecure Secret Management

Contrast Serverless



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<https://www.contrastsecurity.com/developer>

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```
4ppsec — 4ppsec@TMELAMED-C02DX3Q2ML65 — -zsh — 142x57

contrast lambda --function-name <function> [options]

Options

-f, --function-name      Name of AWS lambda function to scan.
-e, --endpoint-url       (optional): AWS Endpoint override, works like in AWS CLI.
-r, --region             (optional): Region override, default to AWS_DEFAULT_REGION env var, works like in AWS CLI.
-p, --profile            (optional): AWS configuration profile override, works like in AWS CLI.
-j, --json-output        (optional): Return response in JSON (versus default human readable format).
-v, --verbose            (optional): Returns extended information to the terminal.

-h, --help               Displays usage guide

https://www.contrastsecurity.com

4ppsec@TMELAMED-C02DX3Q2ML65:~
$ aws lambda list-functions --query 'Functions[?Runtime=='python3.8'].FunctionName' --profile pycon --region us-east-1
[
  "cn-customer-xxe-via-s3",
  "cn-customer-dynamic-via-dynamodb",
  "DVSA-ORDER-COMplete",
  "DVSA-ORDER-GET",
  "DVSA-ORDER-NEW",
  "DVSA-CREATE-RECEIPT",
  "DVSA-USER-INBOX",
  "DVSA-USER-CREATE",
  "DVSA-ORDER-BILLING",
  "DVSA-GET-CART-TOTAL",
  "DVSA-ADMIN-UPDATE-INVENTORY",
  "DVSA-ORDER-CANCEL",
  "DVSA-CRON-JOB-UPDATE",
  "cn-customer-describe-tables",
  "DVSA-ADMIN-UPDATE-ORDERS",
  "DVSA-ORDER-SHIPPING",
  "DVSA-USER-ACCOUNT",
  "DVSA-INIT",
  "cn-customer-xxe-via-apigw",
  "DVSA-ADMIN-GET-ORDERS",
  "cloudessence_agent_39657d8f",
  "DVSA-FEEDBACK-UPLOADS",
  "DVSA-CRON-ORDER-CLEANER",
  "DVSA-ADMIN-GET-RECEIPT",
  "cn-customer-e2e-lock-test-list-bucket-location",
  "DVSA-ADMIN-ORDERS",
  "DVSA-ORDER-UPDATE",
  "DVSA-SEND-RECEIPT-EMAIL",
  "DVSA-USER-PROFILE",
  "cn-customer-list-bucket-location",
  "DVSA-PAYMENT-PROCESSOR",
  "DVSA-CRON-PROCESSOR",
  "cn-customer-dynamic-via-s3"
]

4ppsec@TMELAMED-C02DX3Q2ML65:~
$ contrast lambda --function-name cn-customer-dynamic-via-s3 --profile pycon --region us-east-1 -v
```



github.com/owasp/dvsa


@DVSAowasp

! NOT in PRODUCTION !




DVSA

DAMN VULNERABLE SERVERLESS APPLICATION



<https://owasp.org/www-project-dvsa/>



Thank you

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